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STRATEGICUSE OF ANTIDUMPING LAWTOENFORCE
TACIT INTERNATIONAL COLLUS ION
ABSTRACT
Weconsider the impact of domestic antidumping law in a two-country
partial equilibrium model where domestic and foreign firms tacitly cDllude
in the domestic market.Firms engage in an infinitely repeated game, with
each period composed of a two-stage game.In the first stage each firm
chooses capacity before stochastic domestic demand is realized.In the
second stage, after demand is realized, each firm then sets price. We show
that the introduction of domestic antiduaping law typically leads to the
filing of antidumping suits by the domestic industry in low demand states.
and to more successful collusion and greater market share for domestic firms
during periods of low demand as a result. This occurs in spite of the fact
thatantidumping duties are never actually imposed.That is, the entire
effect of antidu.mptng law comes in the form of a threat to punish foreign
firma with a duty j they should "misbehave."Such a threat is made
credible by filing a suit and, because it is credible, never has to be
implemented. We conclude that the trade-restricting effects of antidumping
law may have little to do with whether duties are actually imposed.
Robert V. Staiger Frank A. Wolak
Stanford University Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305 Stanford, CA 94305I. Introduction
The belief that dumping on foreign markets is closelylinked to
cartelization is nearly as old as the issue of dumping ininternational
trade itself. This view played a critical role in theevolution of
antiduaping laws in the early 20th century. 'liner (1966, p.242) notes,for
instance, that the first antidumping legislation adopted inthe U.S., as
contained in Sections 800-801 of the Revenue Act of 1916, came largelyin
response to the alleged dumping threatfrom the highly cartelized and
heavily protected German industries. This alleged duiping activitytook the
form of unloading excess industrial capacity from the Germancartels on to
the noncartelized (and segmented) U.S. market, Inspired bythis fear, the
original intent of the law was to provide protectionfor U.S. firms against
unfair competition" resulting from the dumping activity ofcartelized firms
abroad.
While the importance of cartels in the evolution of antidumpinglaw is
widely acknowledged, the impact of such laws on the performanceof cartels
is less well understood.1Yet, antidumping law is likely to alter the
environment within which cartels operate in important ways. For example.
in the particular duaping context discussed above, the introductionof
antidumping law into the domestic country will effectthe freedom with which
cartelized foreign finis can dumpexcesscapacity on the noncartelized
domestic market. This, in turn, may have an important impact on the degree
of collusion sustainable by the foreign cartel. Moreover, when made
available to cartel meters, antidumping law maybecomea tool to enforce
1Recent work by Dixit (1988), Ethier (1988), and Prusa (1988) analyze
the effects of antidumping law on firm interaction in a static setting.
1collusion. The Second International Steel Cartel of the 1930s, for example.
exploited the existence of antidumping law to police the dumping activities
of its own members in cartelized markets. In at least one instance.
antidumping action was used successfully by one member of the International
Steel Cartel against another to enforce the cartels price arrangements.2
The impact of antidumping laws on collusive behavior thus seems to be a
potentiallyfruitful area of research, and one that we begin to explore in
this paper. We do so in the context of an environment where firms collude
tacitly and are limited to self-enforcing arrangements. The general setting
we choose is one of an infinitely repeated game in which firms face
stochastic market demand and must choose each period's capacity before the
market demand for the period is realized. Once market demand for the period
has been observed, and with their capacities for the period now fixed, firms
then simultaneously choose prices. Within this setting, fins attempt to
enforce collusion over capacity and price with the credible (subgame
perfect) threat to forever revert to the static Nash equilibrium in the
event of a defection from the cooperative arrangement.3 The 'lost collusive
2In January 1938, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation filed
an antidumping petition against steel producers in the U.S. for selling
steel in the South African market at prices below those agreed upon by the
International Steel Cartel. Dumping duties were levied and the Cartel's
pricing arrangements restored (see Hexner, 1943).
Our model can be viewed essentially as either an infinitely repeated
version of Kreps and Scheinkinan (1983) with firms facing stochastic market
demand that is realized only after capacity is set for the period, or as a
variation on Rotewberg and Saloner (1986a) with the introduction of a
capacity-setting stage at the start of each period. Related work on price-
setting supergames with capacity constraints but without stochastic demand
can be found in Brock and Scheinlcman (1985), Benoit and Krishna (1987), and
Davidson and Deneckere (1987), among others. See also Rotenberg and Saloner
(l986b) for an analysis of the impact of import quotas on collusive behavior.
2equilibrium will, typically have firms carrying excesscapacity in lowdemand
states, and it is with respect to this excess capacitythat antidumping tatc
has its effects.
The observations on antidumping law made at the outset suggest that,in
the presence of tacit collusive behavior, the introductionof antidumping
law may have very different effects depending on the competitive
characteristics of the industry to which the law is made available.In
Staiger and golak (1989), we consider the case in whichthe domescic
industry is competitive but faces imports from firms behavingcollusively in
a segmented market abroad. In that paper, we showthat the introduction of
domestic antidumping law is likely to lead to the filing of antidumping
suits and the imposition of antiduniping duties in low demand states, toless
price collusion abroad, and to a lesser quantity duuiped onthe domestic
market as a result.
In the present paper, we consider the impact of the introductionof
antidumpiug law into the domestic country when domestic and foreignfirms
are tacitly colluding in the domestic market. Here weshow that the
introduction of antidumping law into the domestic country typicallyleads to
the filing of antidumping suits by the domestic industry in lowdemand
states, and to more successful collusion and greatermarket share for
domesticfirms during periodsof low demand asa result. This occurs in
spiteofthe fact that antidumping duties are never actually imposed. That
is, in this setting, and as distinct from the use of antidumpinglaw by
coapetitive industries analyzed in Statger and ¶Jolak (1989),the entire
effect of antidumping law comes in the form of a threat to punish foreign
firms with a duty iftheyshould "misbehave", Such a threat is made
3credible by filing the suit and, because it is credible, never has to be
implemented.' The results then follow from the fact chat by filing an
antidumping suit, the domestic industry is able to diminish the incentives
of foreign firms to aggressively pursue domestic market share. i.e. •defect
from the collusive price arrangement. Hence, with defection now relatively
less attractive fur foreign firms, higher collusive prices in periods of low
demand can be sustained with the filing of an antidumping suit, but only
after appeasing the domestic industrys incentive to defect by giving
domestic firms a larger share of the low-demand market. These results are
developed fornally below.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II we
develop the model in the absence of antiduanping law. Section III introduces
antidumping law into the domestic country and explores the consequences for
collusive behavior. Finally. section IV concludes with a summary of our
results.
II. The Model
We consider an infinitely repeated model of two firms, home (no *) and
foreign (*),sellingto the home market where demand is stochastic and
fluctuates between high and low states. At the beginning of any period,
firms first must simultaneously set capacity K and K*. facing per unit
capacity costs r>O. Once capacity choices for the period are made, the
state of demand for the period is revealed. We assume for simplicity that
demand takes the linear form
-
Thisprediction is consistent with the large number of antidumping




with price as a function of home and foreign supplies q and q*,




Weassume thathighdemand occurs in any period with probability p.After
observing the demand realization for the period, the two firms then
simultaneously set prices facing zero marginal costs of production (up to
capacity).
TheStatic Nash Eouilibriu
We first characterize the unique static Nash equilibrium to this game
which will serve as the credible (subgame perfect) punishment in the
repeatedgame tobe studied next. We rely heavily on Kreps and Scheinkrnan
(1983) and thereforeonthe particular (efficient) rationing rule underlying
their results, Specifically, consumers buy first from the cheapest
supplier, and income effects from price changes are absent.3
Provided that (in a sense to be formalized) the differential between
high demand and low demand is sufficiently great, there exists a uniqueNash
equilibrium to the static game characterized by symmetric capacitychoices
See Davidsonand Deneckere (1986)forresults from a static two-




and prices in the high and low demand states of
-2KN
(3) — PB(K"+K') —
and
(4) P—O.
Thus, capacity choices are such that in high demand states, the two firms
sell their capacity at the market clearing price, while in low demand
states, price is set to marginal cost (which equals zero) and there is
excess capacity.
To show that this is indeed the unique Nash equilibrium to the static
game (under theconditionof sufficiently large differences between high and
low demand states), we follow Kreps and Scheinkman (1g83) and first define
q1(q) i—L,M as the Cournot duopoly best response functions for firms facing
the linear demand function given in (1) and zero marginal costs. It is
straightforward to check that these best response functions must satisfy the




where the notation q(qax) denotes the value of q(q) for all values of
q t x. Moreover, the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputchoice
facing high demand (and zero marginal costs), q, is given by
°E
(7)q——.
Thus, using (2) and (7), and provided p is strictly positive.
K" <q.
It thus follows that
(8) K" Cq5(K');K <q(qq(K")).
Finally, we assume thatthedifferential between highdemandand low demand




7which, using (1) and (2). implies0
(10) K" DL(O).
Putting (S), (6), (8). and (10) together yields
< D,,(O) ￿ K" < q(K') sq(D(O))Cq,4(O)<D(O)
(11) 1
l_Id' <q(q￿q(K"))
With (11) we are now ready to characterize a firm's expected profies in
the static game as a function of its capacity choice facing a capacity
choice K" from its rival. Consider first the range of firm capacity
responses to Id'satisfying
(12) DL(O) ￿K￿
Supposethat the high demand state is realized. Then for all capacity
choices satisfying (12). it must be true that
(13) K sq5(K");K" <q5(K).
The first inequality is a direct consequence of (12) and the second
inequality follows from (11). Appealing to Proposition 1(a) of Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983), we then have that capacity responses satisfying (12)
Condition (9) is in fact more than enough to yield (10), but will be
needed for uniqueness.
Syield high-demand revenues for the firm of P(K+K")K:each firm sells its
entire capacity at the market clearing price.Alternatively, if realized
demand is low, then by (U) and (12)
(14) K t DL(O); K" t DL(O).
Under (14), either firm can satisfy the entire market in the low demand
state for any nonnegative price. Hence, capacity constraints do not upset
the standard Bertrand equilibrium in which price equals marginal cost (which
is zero), so that low demand revenues for the firm are zero. With this
information we can now write the firm's expected profits facinggWforK
in the range defined by (12) as
(15) EU(K,K') —PPB(K+1d)K
-rK for KeD(O),qg(KW)].
Next consider the range of firm capacity responses to
corresponding to
(16) K t q5(K').
clearly (14) will still hold over this range. so that low demand states
continue to yield zero revenues for the firm. Suppose, then, that demand is
high. together, (11) and(16)imply
K>K'; X￿q5(K'); K <D(O).
9Appealing to Proposition 1(b) of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). we then have
that the finns revenues with high demand will be its "Staclcelberg follower'
revenues Pfi(q(K") + K')q(KN) when (16) holds. Thus, expected profits
for capacity responses to 1(11 in the range given by (16) are
(17) EII(K,K") —pP(q5(K") + K")q(K") -rK for,K q(K")
with (17) equal to (15) when K —q(IC).With no, the expression in
(17) is maximized over K in the range given by (16) when K —q(gN)
Therefore, it will never pay the firm to respond to K" with a K that
violates, the right-hand inequality of (12).
Finally, consider the range of firm capacity responses to K"
corresponding to
(18) KS DL(O).
Together, (11) and (18) imply that (1.3) continues to hold, so that firm
revenues with high demand will be P5(K+K").K. Suppose, then, that demand
is low. Together, (11) and (18) imply
(19) K" tK;K' > q(K); KS DL(O).
Appealing once more to Proposition 1(b) of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). we
then have that the firm's revenues with low demand will be no greater than
its rival's staclcelberg follower" revenues P(K+q(K))q(K) when (18)
holds. Thus, expected profits for capacity responses to K" in the range
10given by (18) are no greater than
(20) ff(K,K1) —pP5(K+K)K+ (l-p)P(K+q(Kflq(K) -tICfor
with (20) equal to (15) when K —DL(O).However, it can be shown that,
given our assumption (9), iiT(K,K") takes its maximum value for K in the
range given by (18) at KDL(O). Thus we have
EII(KcfO,DL(0)1,KN) ft(K.[0,D(Ofl,1c') ￿ !fi(K_DL(O),KX) —Efl(k_DL(O)KN).
Essentially, assumption (9) assures thathighdemand states are of
sufficient importance to the expected profits of the firm that it would
never find profitable a reduction of capacity for the purpose of generating
higher Nash profits in low demand states. Hence, under assumption (9) it
will never pay the firm to respond to x'witha K that violates the
left-hand inequality of (12).
We are thus left with (15) as the portion of the firm's expected profit
function relevant to finding the best response to K'. To find this best
response to K', the first order conditions of (IS) can be solved to yield
(2), with (3) and (4) then following from the preceding discussion. This
establishes that (2), (3) and (4) characterize a Nash equilibrium to the
staticgame provided that the difference between high and low demand is
sufficientlygreat (inthesenseof (9)). Uniqueness then follows directly
byusing th. preceding arguments to rule out the existence of additional
equilibria characterized by mm (K,K*) t DL(O). and by using (9) and a
sligbt variation on the preceding arguments to rule out the existence of
11equilibria characterized by mEn (K,K*) c DL(O).'
TheMonoocly Solution
Before tuning to the dynamic game,weconsider the monopoly solution
tothe static game above. This will provide the collusive ideal toward
which the two firmswillstrive in the repeated setting of the next
subsection.
The monopolists problem is much simpler than the duopoly examined
above since it does not involve a price setting game subject to capacity
constraints. The problem is simply to choose capacity facing uncertain
demand, and then upon the realization of demand for the period to choose the
profit maximizing quantity to sell subject to the constraint that quantity
deliveredbe nogreater than capacity.
Consider first the choice of output given a low demand realization.
Lowdemandprofits (revenues) as a function of output q are given by
(21)I4(q) —P(q)q.
The monopolists unconstrained profit maximizing quantity choice if the
demand realization is low is, from the first-order condition of (21), given
by q—a./2. Because themonopolist can sell at most its capacity K. the
constrainedquantity choice is characterized by
The variation involves replacing K' with K" (defined by (24)) in
equation (20) and noting that,with K(1() denotingcapacity best-response
functions,K(KM) SK(Ke(O,KMIYSK.Theproofthen establishes under
condition (9) that K(I)c(DL(0),K"] which, to4ether with the inequalities
above, implies that any capacity choice Ke[0,te] by one's rival will
induce a best capacity response X(K€(O,KM]) e [D(O),K"J. Hence, no
equilibria can exist with min(K.K*) CD(O).
12— min(K,°12




which is strictly concave in K.
Assuming IC >aLl2,
so that capacity does not bind in low demand
states, the first order condition for maximizing (22) Is
8EII"(K) a3-2K 8II ötlL(
(23) —0— )+(l-p)— - r.
8K ft ôq 81<
8q (K)











Note that (2) and (24) imply I —(3/2)K".Finally, assumption (9)
ensures that I >a,_/2as assumed in the derivation of (24). Thus. be
monopoly solution has K" chosen such that in high demand states aid
capacity is utilized, while in low demand states there exists excess
capacity.
The Dynamic Case
We are now ready to characterize the dynamic game. We explore an
infinitely repeated version of the static game described above. The two
firms achieve the most collusive (syiimetric) outcome sustainable by the
credible (subgame perfect) threat to revert forever to the static Nash
equilibrium characterized above in the event that either firm defects. In
order to focus on the dynamics of sustaining collusion in a stochastic
environment, we will maintain assumptions which allow the firms to sustain
their most preferred capacity choice. Thus, any difficulties in sustaining
full collusion will occur with regard to the pricing decisions, which by
assumption, are made once demand for the period has been observed. We begin
by deriving the conditions under which the fully collusive capacity and
price choices are sustainable by the threat of Nash reversion.
14The Fully Collusive Ecuilibrium
Inthe fully collusive equilibrium, firms make symmetric capacity
choices Kc and pricing decisions to replicate the monopoly outcome of





where"s denote fully collusive magnitudes. If full collusion is
sustainable, then neither firm can have an incentive to unilaterally defect
from the cooperative choices characterized by (27). (28), and (29). Because
both firms are completely symmetric, we characterize the no defection"
condition in the domestic finn notation. A firm may defect from the
cooperative agreement either in its capacity choice or in its price choice.
The former defection can not be conditioned on the state of demand (which is
unknownatthetime),while the latter defection can be conditioned on the
demandrealizationfor the period. We consider each in turn.
If the domestic firm unilaterally defects from its cooperative capacity
choice I, it will face noncooperative pricing in the second stage of the
current period, followed by infinite repetition of the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium characterized earlier. Denoting the defection capacity as
1(0, assumption (9) rules out defection capacity choices 1(D< DL(O)in
15response to a foreign capacity choice of K'in the sa1e way that this
assumption ruled outcapacitychoices K C DL(O) in response to a foreign
capacity choice of K' in the static game analyzed earLier. Suppose, then.
that
(30) K°
Since I t DL(O) is assured by (9), defection capacity choices satisfying
(30) allow either firm to satisfy the entire market in low demand states for
any nonnegative price. Hence, for 1(0in the range given by (30), the
standard Bertrand equilibrium obtains in low demand states with price equal
to marginal cost and low demand revenues of zero for the defecting firm.
On the other hand, defection capacity choices K° > q(K') in response to
a foreign capacity choice of t can be ruled out as long as r>0 in an
exactly analogous way that capacity choices K > q(K") in response to a
foreign capacity choice of 1(2were ruled out in the static game. Hence we
also have
1(0q1(1(); L(C < q(q(KC)) ￿ q(K°)
which (appealing once more to Proposition 1(a) of Kreps and Scheinkman
(1983)) assures that K and 1(0are such that in high demand states the
two firms will sell all of their capacity at the market clearing price.
Thus, a firms current expected gain from defecting to 1(0in the relevant




+(l-p)(O- ) - r(KD - Kd]
2
where the first term in brackets is the revenuefrom defecting in the high
demand state less the collusive revenue inthat state the second term in
brackets is the revenue from defecting inthe low demand state (zero) less
the collusive revenue in that state, andthe last term captures the change
in capacity costs associated with defectionThe firm will choose K° to
aximize (31). Direct calculation yields 1(D(1(',p)
—(3/2)I(°—
sothat defection entails installing greater capacitythan that permitted by





Now consider a defection from the cooperative price,with the defection
price denoted by P i—L.H. In the hIghdemand state, defection must
entail raising one's price above P, since eachfirm sells its entire
capacity at P. In thelowdemand state, defectiot entails shaving ones
price just below P.using(9).
1t°—1'/2
—3K'/4 k DL(O) ￿ D(P ￿ 0),
so that a firm that defects by shaving its pricebelow P will have
sufficient capacity to capture the entire market,With this, the firm's




where Q(P,P) has the defecting firm facing a nonnegative residual
demand and making sales equal to the minimum of this and its capacity.
The optimal defection price P will be chosen to maximize (33). As
discussed above, in the low-demand state, optimal defection entails shaving
ones price Just below so that F(P) —P.For the high-demand





Thus•thefirm s currentincentive to defect from the cooperative price is
onlypositivein low demand states. In high demand states the firm already
sells its capacity with marginal revenue greater than (short run) marginal
Cost.
-
Definingw(t,P ,P) as the present discounted value of maintaining
perfectcapacityand price cooperation into the infinite future which is
18itself a function of the perfectly cooperative capacity and price functions.
theTho defection" conditionthat must hold if perfect cooperation in
capacity and price is sustainable is given by
(a) O(Kc.P) Cc,(KCPtP)
(36) (b) O(P) SwP,P)
(c)Cl(P) Sw(KCP,P)
TheMost Collusive Equilibrium
If (36) holds, then perfect collusion in capacity and price can be
sustained and (27), (28), and (29) characterize the equilibrium capacity and
pricing policies of the two firms. However, if (36) does not hold,then
perfect collusion in capacity and price cannot be sustained. In this case
we focus on the most collusive agreement sustainable by the threatof Nash
reversion. Such an agreement will have at least one of the incentive
constraints in (36) holding with equality, i.e., binding. While (36 Cc))
will clearly not bind in equilibrium as long as cooperation means anything
(w(t,P,P) >0), equilibrium could have either (36 (a)) or (36 (b)) bind:
the toner corresponds to the case where perfectly collusive capacity
choices are unsustainable, while the latter corresponds to the case in which
perfectly collusive price, are unsustainable in low demand states. Wewill
focus on the latter case, and provide parameter ranges which yield this case
as an equilibrium.
Given that we have restricted our attention to cases in which perfectly
collusive capacity choices are sustainable, the next question is what
cooperative capacity level represents the most collusive choice. Asnoted
19above, if the threat of static Nash reversion is sufficient to sustain
perfect price collusion given any cooperative capacity choice, then the
firms will attempt to sustain the (symmetric) cooperative capacity choices
It'/2 and support the fully collusive, i.e., monopoly, outcome. If, on the
other hand, given capacity choices K41/2 the firms find fully collusive
pricing unsustainable by the threat of static Nash reversion, it must be in
the low demand state that full collusion is unsustainable since, by (34) and
(35), only in this state is the current gain from price defection strictly
positive. In the event that low demand states are associated with less than
fully collusive pricing given capacity RM/2, it is possible that a choice
of cooperative capacity K° < K"/2 will yield higher cooperative profits
for the firms, but only if the smaller capacity choice helps to sustain a
more collusive price in periods of low demand. This, latter condition can
only be true provided that Kc C D(P) in equilibrium. Only then would
the lower capacity choice reduce the current incentive to defect in low
demand states, and thus have the potential for raising the sustainable
cooperattve low-demand price. However, such a reduction in cooperative
capacity below K"/2 will clearly not be optimal provided that, given
cooperative capacity Kc —L&/2,the sustainable low-demand price P is
sufficiently close to the fully collusive price P. Under this condition,
the cost of lower capacity in tents of foregone high-demand profit will
outweigh the benefit in terms of increased profit in the low demand state.
While noting that thequalitativenature of our results would be preserved
for any cooperative capacity choice Kc < I'/2 provided only that perfect
price collusion given K" is not sustainable, for ease of exposition We
choose to restrict our attention to the case where is "close to" Pr
20in equilibrium. Thus, in deriving the most cooperative equilibrium for the
Linus we set cooperative capacity at —K"/2.
We begin by characterizing the most cooperative price function taking
the present discounted gains from maintaining future cooperation w as
fixed. Recall that, for Kc —I/2,the most cooperative price sustainable




Atthis price, each finn sells its capacity KC —gM/2Thus, the only
incentive a finn might have to defect would cone from deviating to a higher
price, which can never be profitable given cooperative capacityKc_ KM/2
since finns face positive marginal revenue (and zero marginal cost) in high
demand states. Hence, defection in high demand states is not an issue.
Consider, then, a firm's current incentive to defect from the
cooperative price P in a period of low demand. If a firm defects, it
will do so by shaving its price below and capturing the entire market
(recall that (9) ensures that Kc t DL(P k 0)).Its current gains from




using (37) the cooperative price in low demand states must satisfy
21P D(P)S w(P,P)
- 2
where w(•) is itself a function of equilibrium cooperative prices.
Assuming that the perfectly collusive outcome is not sustainable in the

















Thehigfri price satisfying (38) is strictly greater than P (see
(26)). Therefore, the optimal defection price (Fe)wouldlie below this
price by a discrete amount, and the gains from defection would be higher
than .Assuch, this price can be eliminated because it is not, in fact,
sustainable as a cooperative price.
22While (39) gives the most cooperative pricing function P as a
function of the present discounted gains from maintaining the cooperative
arrangement into the infinite future ca is in fact itself a function of
P. Thus, the next step is to solve for the fixed point,where"''s
denote most-cooperative equilibrium magnitudes. The fixed point,
,
ensuresthat the P supported by
iyieldspresent discounted gains from
maintaining the cooperative arrangement into the infinite futurewhich are
in fact equal to t.Tosolve for ,firstnote that w is defined as
6
(40) a —— [Efl(i,It.P)-EIt(i,K",P)).
1-6
where 6c(C,l) is the discount factor. Explicit calculation allows (40) to
be rewritten as
& KM D(Pt(w))
(41) w —— (p(F(w)—- + (l-p)[P(w) I- r(—-K"]).
1-6 2 2 2
Solving for the fixed point of (41) yields




using (42), the equilibrium most cooperative price function Pthencomes
from evaluating (39) at ,providedthat the resulting i'is"near" but
not greater than P, i.e., provided that is near but not greater than
23a/BØ se.(26)and (39)).
Finally, given P and we need to deterrine the conditions under
which firas hav, no incentive to defect from gC —KM/2.Calculations
similar to those leading up to (32) yield an expression for the current
incentive to defect from cooperative capacity at —KM,2,given by
(43)fl(1(t)— p -(l-p)w. l6
p
Hence,therequirement that fl(Kc) Sat Kt_XH/2reduces to (—) S
2.p 3
Theassumption that the fully collusive capacity choice KM/2 is
sustainablein equilibrium (fl(KC)SatKc_KM/2)in combination with
(9) and theassumptionthat the fully collusive low-demand price is not
sustainablealong the equilibrium path (ê<P) imply threesets of
inequalityrestrictionsthat we have imposed on the model. As noted above,
th. restriction < is equivalent to C/8fi.Substituting (42)




Rewriting equation (9) as 4 and using (44) reveals that
a rang,ofvalues for theparattersa' •a,.,ndr exist which




24Condition (45) reflects the fact that if & were sufficiently large (so
that (45) were violated), then thefullycollusive low-demand price could be
sustained, contrary to our assumption that <





Hence,the assumption chat the fully collusivecapacity choice gM,2is
sustainable inequilibrium amounts to placing restrictions on S andp
(given by (46)) which ensure that p is not too largeIntuitively, the
current incentive for a firm to defect to a higher capacity will besmall
providedthat the likelihood of a high demand realization (p)is low,
since only in highdemandstates would this defection pay off. Hence, with
the probability of high demand realizations not too large, the collusive
difficulties of fins will be restricted to their ability to maintain high
prices in low dentand states,
Finally, putting (45) and (46) together yields the following bounds on
6as a function of p which, if satisfied, guarantee that (9) and the
conditions that fl(Kc) S at1<C_gM12andthat < will all be




25Provided that pC 2/3,a range of &s exist which satisfy (47) and.
consequently, which assure the existence of a range of values for the
remaining parameters of the model consistent with the inequality
restrictions we have imposed.9
III. Dumping
In this section we introduce antidumping law into the domestic country
and explore the way in which the tacit collusive equilibrium of the previous
section is affected when the domestic firm is given the opportunity to bring
antidumping suits against its foreign rival. We begin with a brief
description of the relevant aspects of U.S. antidumping law.
DescriDtion of 1) S. Antidurfiping Law
Antidumping law has had a long and complex legislative history in the
U.S. which we do not attempt to review here. Instead, we provide a brief
summary of the steps involved in a dumping case under current U.S.law,from
initiating an antidumping duty investigation to the final determination and
assessment of duties.10 We then attempt to distill the key elements of this
process, with the aim of capturing these elements in our subsequent
It should be reiterated here that we have imposed the condition that
SatKc_Rhl/2onlyfor ease of exposition. The qualitative nature
of our results will hold for any sustainable cooperative capacity choice so
long as (9) and the condition that < aresatisfied.
10TheTrade Agreement Act of 1979 involved a major rewriting of U.S.
antiduaping law. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 contains several
amendments to the antidumping law of the 1979 Act that, while substantive.
are not relevant for the particular issues we consider here.
26modeling.
Once an antidumping petition is filed with the Commerce Department's
International Trade Administration (ITA) and with the International Trade
Commission (ITC), the ITA has 20 days to make a petition determination,'
that is, to decide whether the petition is in order and, if so, to commence
an investigation.'' The ITA must notify the ITC promptly of its petttion
determination. If affirmative, the ITC then has 45 days to make a
'preliminary determination" based on the "best available information"
(typically that supplied by the petitioner) of whether there is reason to
believe that the industry under review is "materially injured' or
'threatened with material injury" or that the establishment of the industry
"is materially retarded" as a result of imports. If the ITC's preliminary
determination is negative, the investigation is terminated. Provided that
the ITC's preliminary determination is affirmative, And within 160 days of
the initial filing of the suit (or within 90 days if all interested parties
agree to a "waiver of verification"), the ITA must make a "preliminary
determinations of whether there is reasonable evidence that merchandise "is
being sold, or is likely to be sold at less than fair value.
12Anegative
preliminary determination by the ITA does not terminate the investigation.
However, if the preliminary determination of the ITA is affirmative, itmust
provide an estimate of the "dumping margin," and is then required to order
the "suspension of liquidation" of the affected imported goods and the
''Petitionscan be either "self-initiated" by the ITA or initiated by
an "interested party" on behalf of the industry. The former is by far the
exception, with the most promirent example being the Trigger Price Mechanism
12In"extraordinary complicated" cases, the ITA may postpone making
its preliminary determination until the 210th day after filing.
27posting by importers of a cash deposit or bond to coverthe estimated
dumping duties payable pending the final outcomeof the investigation. If
the industry alleges "critical circumstances" and the hA findsevidence of
either a history of dumping in the industry or that importers were orshould
have been knowledgeable about ongoing dumping, or if there are "massive"
imports of the relevant product over a "relatively short period."the
dumping duties can be applied retroactively 90 days prior tothe "suspension
of liquidation' order.
At this point the investigation may be terminated or suspended orit
may continue on to the final determination.Termination occurs if and only
if the petition is withdrawn by the petitioner (the industry)- This usually
comes about as a result of price agreements reached by thedomestic industry
and foreign firms named in the suit, Suspension occurs if the foreignfirms
that are the subject of the dumping allegation reach an agreement with the
rCA to eliminate sales to the U.S. market at less than fair value or to
cease exporting to the U.S. market completely." In the case of suspension.
any violation of the agreement will result in reinitiationof the
investigation. If the case is neither terminated nor suspended thehA
must within 75 days of its preliminary determination make a "final
determination" of whether the merchandise under investigation 'is being, or
is likely to be* sold in the U.S. at less than fair value.1' If the ITAs
13Under"extraordinary circumstances," an agreement by the accused
foreign firms to eliminate the "injurious effect" of their actions maybe
sufficient to suspend the investigation.
'TheIT?. may postpone its final determination until the 135th day
afterits preliminary determination if requested to do so by either the
petitioner orthe firms against which the dumping allegations were made.
28preliminary determination was affirmative, then the TIC must make its final
determinationof injury within 45days oftheITAs final determination (or
within 120 days ofthehA's preliminarydetermination,whichever islater).
Ifthe ITA's preliminary determination was negative, and its final
determination is affirmative, then the TIC has 75 days from the ITA's
affirmativefinal determination to make its final determination of injury.
Lastly,if the final determinations of both the ITh and TIC are affirmative.
the ITA has1 days within whichto instruct customs officers to assess the
appropriateantidumping duties. If either the ITC or the ITA determination
is negative, the investigation is terminated.
As is evident from this brief review, foreign firms have ample
opportunity during the course of the investigation to take actions which
either terminate or suspend the proceedings. The former requires reaching
agreement over price (and quantity) with petitioners, i.e., domestic
producers, while the latter requires reaching agreement with the ITA. A
third option for foreign firms is simply to 'behave,' so that the final
dumping determination is negative. In this regard, Prusa (1988) reports
that over one third of the U.S. antidumping investigations initiated between
1980 and 1985 were eventually withdrawn, with over half of the remaining
suits ultimately rejected by the flC/ITA.'' On the other hand, if the
investigation results in a positive dumping determination, antiduniping
duties can be imposed on imports potentially dating from the time of the
initial filing. Taken together, these two observations suggest that the
" Agreements between foreign firms and domestic petitioners are
encouraged under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which exempts such parties
from prosecution under U.S. antitrust law. See Prusa (1988) for a thorough
analysis of this exemption and its implications for the effectsof
antidumping law.
29filing of antidumping suits might be viewed as a mechanism bywhich domestic
firms can alter the incentives of foreign firms to aggressively pursue
domestic market share. In particular, by filing a petition at the beginning
of a period in which dumping is likely to be a problem, the domestic
industry can assure that dumping by foreign firms wilt be met by antidumping
duties applied to that period's sales.15 This characterization of
antidumping law motivates the modeling approach we pursue below.
Modelin antidumoin law
For the purposes of the formal model, we take dumping by the foreign
firm to be synonymous with a defection from the cooperative price, i.e.
cutting its price to steal market share from the home firm. With the above
discussion as our guide, we model antidumping law as providing the home firm
with the opportunity to change the foreign firm's payoff in the event of a
foreign defection from the cooperative price. Specifically, for the cost of
filing the suit, the home firm is able to assure that a foreign defection
from the cooperative price will be met by an antidumping duty in the period
in which defection takes place.''
16 We abstract in this characterization from any "noise' in the
IrA/nC decision and assume that an antidumping duty is imposed if and only
if dumping has occurred. Accordingly, we also abstract from the foreign
fin's cost of defending itself during the antidumping proceedings.
17 If the punishment (antidunping duty) were delayed until the period
after a defection is observed, the basic arguments of this section would
still carry through though in a less transparent way. Note also that we
have chosen to proceed as if the introduction of domestic antidumping law
would have no impact on the static Nash equilibriun derived earlier. and
thus have assumedthatthe presence of domestic antidumping law has no
impacton firmpayoffs in the punishment phase of the dynamic game. It can
beshownthat antiduaping suits will in fact never be filed in the static
Nash equilibrium (and thus that the static Nash payoffs remain unchanged
30We now amend the dynamic model studied above and introduce antidumping
law into the home country. The timing of moves in the game is as follows.
As before, at the beginning of any period, firms simultaneously set capacity
K and K* facing per unit capacity costs r>O, after which the state of demand
is revealed. It is at this point that the home firm now has the option of
filing an antidumping suit against the foreign firm at a filing cost F>O.
With the decision of whether or not to file common knowledge the firms then
simultaneously set prices for the period.
Consider first the high demand state. Since the potential benefits for
the home firm associated with filing a suit stem from relaxing the incentive
constraint of the foreign firm, it is clear that a suit will never be filed
in the high demand state, as long as F>O. This is because in the high
demand state the two firms already collude perfectly (the incentive
constraints don't bind), so that paying a fee F to reduce the foreign firi's
payoff in defecting from the cooperative price would yield no offsetting
benefits to the home firm in the form of larger cooperative high-demand
profits." Thus, the domestic firm will not file a suit in high demand
when domestic antidunping law is introduced) provided that the finding of
"material injury" requires an import surge greater than some fixed e >0.
and that dumping is deemed "inactionable" (with no duty forthcoming) if this
minimum injury standard is not met. With this assumption, the results of
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) are unaffected by the introduction of domestic
antidumping law, so that the law would have no impact on static Nash
equilibrium payoffs for the domestic (and foreign) firm.
'Onemight argue that the asywmietric access to antidumping law
enjoyed by the home firm would allow it to force" upon the foreign firm an
asymmetric sharing of the cooperative (market) capacity K" +Kc*,perhaps
with K° > I&. While asymmetric sharing of capacity can not be ruled out
as a cooperative equilibrium, any such sharing agreement that entailed the
filing of suits by the home firm in either or both states of demand would he
Pareto dominated by the same sharing rule without filing (thus avoiding the
filing cost F>O). Hence, one would not expect to see the filing of
31states for F>O, and cooperation in the highdemand state is unchanged frot
its description in the dynaic game of the previous section.Consider,
then, the low demand state. If a suit is not filed bythe home country.
nothing changes from the description of the lowdemand state given in the
previous section. In particular; the most cooperative pricesustainable
with the threat of Nash reversion will be below the optimal collusive price
in the low demand state (given our parameter assumptions). Butwith
incentive constraints binding in the low demand state absent a suit (see
(38)), filing a suit may. by altering the incentives of the foreignfirm to
defect from the cooperative price, relax its incentive constraint atthe
preexisting cooperative price and be worth its cost to thedomestic firm by
allowing greater collusion on low demand price. However, forthis to
happen, the incentive for the domestic firm to detect must be appeased as
the cooperative price is raised, and the only way to accomplish this is to
give the domestic firm greater market share in low demand states. Hence, we
now explore how the filing of a suit changes the incentives todefect from
the cooperative price and the impact of these changes on cooperative price
and market shares in the low demand state.
Defining S as the cooperative market share for the home firm inthe
low demand state and r as the ad valorem antidumping duty to be levied on
antidumping suits emerge as part of a cooperative capacity sharing
agreement. Asymmetric access to antidumping law therefore introduces no
relevant asymmetry into the determination of the cooperative capacity
shares. Thus, the logic of focusing on symmetric cooperative capacity
choices Kc —Iis unaffected by the presence or absence of antidumping
law. Nevertheless, as we show below, asymmetric sharing of the market in
low demand states (when capacity does not bind) will emerge in the most-
cooperative equilibrium with the introduction of domestic antidumping law.
32the (current) domestic sales of a foreign firm found guilty of dumping,: we
can define the current incentive to defect in the low demand state for each




Because of the asymmetry introduced by the existence of antidumping law in
the domestic country, we now need to characterize separately the incentive
constraints for both the domestic and the foreign firms. The no defection
conditions which the cooperative low-demand price and market sharing rule
must satisfy then become
Ca
and
' For simplicity we take the magnitude of the antidumping duty, if
levied, to be fixed and not necessarily reflective of the true" dumping
margin whichwouldin this case be measured as the difference between
and a 'constructed value" measure. Note also that whileU.S. antidumping
lawprovides for the imposition of antidumping duties on domestic imporcers
rather than foreign exporters, it permits importers to be reimbursed by
foreign exporters for the payment of dumping duties on all imports for which
the agreement topurchasewas made prior to the suspension of liquidation
orderandwherethemerchandise is exported beforea determination ofsales
at less than fair value (see Dale. 1980, pp. 104-103, note 42). Hence, as
embodied in (49), we take the incidence of the antidumping duty to fall on
the foreign exporter rather than the importer of foreign products.
33Suppose that perfect collusion is not possible in low demand states even
given the antidumping duty r. Then the most cooperative low demand price












with w and w* given by
6 a1-I&I c-2K rcelw*
(54).o —— (p( —- Kill + (l-p)[ -F]
-rf—
-Kfl)
1-6 8 2 $ 1-r 2
346 a8-KMKMo-2K" KM
(55) ,* — — ______ — - K&]+(l-p)w - - KR])
1-6 p 2 $ 2
Solving for the fixed point of(54) and (55) then yields












'— — (p[( -( )K1]+(l-p)w1
-r(—
-KR)I.
1-6 fi 2 $ 2
To analyze the way in which the introduction of antidumping law in the
domestic country effects the tacit collusive equilibrium in the absence of
such law, we note first that the home firm can always choose not to file anc
receive equilibrium expected discounted gains from tacit collusion equal to
.Thus,the domestic firm will choose to file antidunping suits in low
demandstatesif and only if
(58)>
thatis, if (and only if) the domestic firms equilibrium expected
35discounted gains from tacit collusion (net of filing costs) are greater by
filinginlow demand states than by notfiling at all. Using (42)and(36).
itis straightforward to check that
(59) ,1(F—C,v—0) —a.




Since the domestic firm will choose to file antidumping suits in low demand
states if and only if >,,expressions(59) and (60) together imply
that for small filing costs F there exists a range of antidumping duties
such that the domestic firm files antidumping suits if and only if the
demand realization for the period is low. Note that the domestic firm files
antiduaping suits in the presence of low demand, even though no antidumping
duties will ever actually be levied in equilibrium. The entire effect of
filingcomes inthe formofa threat to punish theforeignfirm ifitshould
"misbehavewhich, because it is credible, never has to be implemented.2°
Next consider the effect of domestic antidumping law on the foreign
firm. Using (42), (56). and (51). it can be shown that
20Ifthe petitioner is taken to suffer a loss of "good standing" with
theITCwhenever it fails (after the initial salesat_lessthanfair.Value
determination) to withdraw a suit which is ultimately rejected in the final
determination, and if prices are set for the period by the time of the
initial sates-at-less-than-fair-value determination, then equilibrium will
haveallsuits end in withdrawal.
36>w if and only if
and
(62) L>ifand only if >
Putting(61) and (62) together yields
(63) w1 > > wif and only if >
Inwords, if (and only if) the underlying parameters of the model are such
that antidumping law is utilized by the domestic firm (i.e.. if (58) holds
so that filing occurs in low demand states), then both domestic and foreign
firms gain from the existence of domestic antidumping law, with the home
finn gaining more (net of filing costs) than the foreign firm.
Finally, we consider the mechanism through which the home firm gains
more than the foreign firm from the existence of domestic antidumping laws,
despite the fact that it is the home finn that must incur the filing costs
This mechanism is the shifting of cooperative market share to the domestic
fin in low demand states. To show that the domestic finn gains market
share in low demand states as a result of filing the suit, we note that,
using (54) and (5S), and substituting in (48) through (51). expression(62)
implies that the equilibrium most cooperative market share forthe domestic
firm in low demand states, (r), satisfies
37(64) (r) >
providedonly that w1 >w(so that filing occurs in low demand states).
Since cooperative market shares are symmetric in high demand states and
symmetric in low demand states in the absence of antidumping law, (64)
implies that the filing of an antidumping suit by the domestic firm in low
demand states is accompanied by an increase in the cooperative market share
of th. domestic firm. Such a shift in market share in the presence of
antidumping suits is required in order to mitigate the incentive of the
domestic firm to defect from price cooperation as the cooperative price is
moved to the more collusive level facilitated by the suit. Hence, by
facilitating both hi&ier collusive (low-demand) prices and greater domestic
(low-demand) market share, antidumping law contains both rent-augmenting and
rent-shifting elements.
Finally, while we have stressed the positive implications of our
analysis: it is important to note here that the rent-shifting aspect of
antidumping law is not sufficient to make it attractive as a policy for
raising the sum of the expected present discounted value of domestic
producer and consumer surplus in the industry.2' To see that this is true,
note first that the introduction of domestic antidumping law leaves
collusive capacity and collusive high-demand price unaffected, so that only
the surplus in low-demandstatesneed be considered. But the introduction
We ignore here the filing costs born by the domestic firm as well
as any resource costs associated with the ITA/ITC procedures. Such costs
would only strengthen the conclusion.
38of antidumping law facilitates greater price collusion in low demand states.
so that total market surplus (the sum of domestic consumer surplus, domestic
producer surplus, and foreign producer surplus) must decline. Hence, a
sufficient condition for the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus
in low demand states to fall with the introduction of domestic antidumping
law is that foreign producer surplus not decline. This condition is
guaranteed by (63). Thus, in spite of the domestic rent-shifting effects of
the policy, the sum of expected discounted producer and consumer surplus at
home must decline with the introduction of domestic antidunping law.
IV Conclusion
We have attempted in this paper to model the impact of domestic
antidumping law on the behavior of domestic and foreign firms that are
tacitly colluding in the domestic market. Our major conclusions can be
summarized as follows. The filing of an antidumping suit can become a
useful mechanism with which to enforce price collusion during periods when
collusion is otherwise difficult to sustain. In particular, if firms face
stochastic market demand and must install capacity before the resolution of
this uncertainty, price collusion will be most difficult to sustain in
periods of low demand, and it is in such periods that antidumping suits will
tend to arise. By reducing the incentives of the foreign firm to defect
from any collusive price, the filing of an antidumping suit by the domestic
firm allows a greater degree of collusion (a higher price) to be sustained
in low demand states, but only by shifting cooperative market share toward
the domestic firm to appease its incentive to defect. As a consequence the
introduction of antidumping law into the domestic country will result in the
39filing of suits in low-demand states, and to higher low-demand prices,
greater market share for the domestic firm in low-demand states,and greater
expected discounted profits for foreign and domestic firms alike,all
without the imposition of a single antidumping duty. However, once domestic
consumer surplus is also considered, the domestic country must lose from the
introduction of antidumping law.
While these results are strong and intuitive, they have come from a
model which is highly stylized and special in a number of ways. We have
simplified the analysis greatly by limiting the parameter space and
restricting our attention to i.i.d. shocks to market demand. Future
theoretical work must focus on the degree to which the strong insights whtch
emerge from this model are preserved in more general settings.
Nevertheless. we feel that the positive predictions of even this simple
model are sufficiently rich to allow meaningful empirical exploration of the
relevance of our ideas for the workings of U.S. antidumping law in practice.
This is especially true given the sharp predictions which emerge from a
comparison of our results here with those in Staiger and Wolak (lg89)
concerning the impact of market structure in the petitioning industry on the
frequency with which antidumping petitions should end in the imposition Of
duties.While both models predict the filing of antidumping suits in low-
demand states, in Staiger and Wolak (1988) we assume that the petitioning
industry is perfectly competitive and find that antidumping suits against
collusive foreign firms always end in duties, while our results here imply
that when the petitioner is a member of the tacitly collusive
(international) cartel the filing of antidumping suits serves a
Eundenta1ly different purpose and antidunping duties are never actually
40imposed. Taken together, these stylized findings suggest that the frequency
with which antidumping petitions end in the imposition of duties should be
higher for more competitive petitioning industries. We hope to test the
empirical implications of these and other results in future work.
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